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SURVEY OF WASHINGTON LAW
It seems quite likely that the decision in the principal case is the
unfortunate consequence of this type of procedure. The net effect of
this procedure is that the court tends to be result-oriented. As it ap-
pears to have operated in the principal case, the assigned judge wrote
an opinion to which the other justices joined or dissented on result,
and careful attention to theory was neglected. The writer of the major-
ity opinion in the principal case was the author of the concurring
opinion in Feigenbaum, in which he concurred in the result but dis-
agreed with the abolition of assumption of risk. The writer of the
majority opinion in Feigenbaum signed the majority opinion in the
principal case." It is possible that the latter judge changed his mind,
or that the language regarding abolition was unimportant-or that,
because of workload pressure, the inconsistency was never discussed
and resolved. If the inconsistency is attributable to the decisional pro-
cedure forced by the court's tremendous workload, then measures
must be taken to improve the situation. An inviting solution is a pro-
posed constitutional amendment which would provide an intermediate
appellate court.2 In conjunction with an intermediate court, the
supreme court should have discretionary appellate jurisdiction so that
it would have greater control over its workload.
DEFINITION OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE UNDER
THE GUEST STATUTE
On a bright summer morning, defendant slowed her automobile,
intending to make a left turn. The road stretched dry and straight
before her for more than a mile. She turned on her left signal blinker,
observed a truck in the distance coming toward her, and looked in her
rear view mirror. Seeing a car pulling out to pass her, she slowed
further and waited for it to go by. Then she turned abruptly to the
left and drove straight into the path of the oncoming truck. Plaintiff
passenger, seriously injured in the collision, sued defendant, alleging
gross negligence. The trial court sustained defendant's challenge to
the evidence, ruling as a matter of law that defendant's actions did
'Judge Ott, who wrote the "majority" opinion in Feigenbaum, signed the
majority opinion in the principal case. Judge Donworth signed the majority
opinions in both cases, and Judge Hamilton, who joined Judges Ott and Donworth
in Feigenbaum, dissented in the principal case, but not because he reasoned that
assumption of risk had been abolished in the earlier case.
'ashington Judicial Council, Revision of Judicial Article IV of the Wash-
ington Constitution (2d proposed draft, docket No. 100, 1962).
1966]
WVASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
not constitute gross negligence within the meaning of the guest stat-
ute.1 On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
reversed and remanded. Held: In a factual setting involving a high
degree of risk, the exercise of some care does not, as a matter of law,
preclude the existence of gross negligence. Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wash.
Dec. 2d 317, 407 P.2d 798 (1965).2
In Washington, the rule that the host driver is liable to his guest
passenger only for gross negligence originated in a series of decisions
between 1921 and 1926.1 A study of cases through 1930 reveals that
the court consistently defined gross negligence as the failure to exercise
slight care, and interpreted failure to exercise slight care as requiring
conduct evidencing a total lack of care or reckless disregard for the
safety of the passenger.' In these early cases, the court frequently ruled
that the evidence, although obviously showing negligence, was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to take the issue of gross negligence to the
jury.' Without changing the basic definition of gross negligence, the
court began, in about 1933, increasingly to leave the question of gross
negligence to the jury under factual patterns indicating obvious
negligence. 6
After enactment of the guest statute in 1933,1 which limited recov-
ery to cases of intentional injury, the court was not faced with the
'WASH. REV. CODE § 46.08.080 (1961).
"Two other cases decided on the same day involved related questions under the
guest statute. In Dole v. Goebel, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 332, 407 P.2d 807 (1965), the
court held that where defendant skidded into a collision in the wrong lane in a
construction area marked with thirteen warning signs in two miles, the unexplained
presence of his car in that lane was sufficient to take the issue of gross negligence
to the jury, and that the instruction "'gross negligence' means the failure to
use slight care for the safety of the guest passengers" was sufficient. In Hansen v.
Pauley, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 339, 407 P.2d 811 (1965), the court affirmed an order
granting a new trial where the following instruction had been given:
The term "failure to exercise slight care" ... means to operate a motor vehicle
with such a degree of inattention, or rashness or recklessness as evinces a
total want of care for the safety of the occupants of the motor vehicle.
'Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 Pac. 27 (1926); Heiman v. Kloizner, 139
Wash. 655, 247 Pac. 1034 (1926); Pinckard v. Pease, 115 Wash. 282, 197 Pac. 49
(1921).
'Meachem & Mickelwait, Gross Negligence, 5 WAsH . L. REv. 91 (1930).
'Lothspeich v. Morrell, 173 Wash. 55, 21 P.2d 287 (1933) ; Dawson v. Foster, 169
Wash. 516, 14 P.2d 458 (1932); Craig v. McAtee, 160 Wash. 337, 295 Pac. 146
(1931); Dailey v. Phoenix Inv. Co., 155 Wash. 597, 285 Pac. 657 (1930); Blood
v. Austin, 149 Wash. 41, 270 Pac. 103 (1928); Klopfenstein v. Eads, 143 Wash.
104, 254 Pac. 854, 256 Pac. 333 (1927); Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 Pac.
27 (1926).
6 Nenezich v. Elich, 183 Wash. 657, 49 P.2d 33 (1935); Pickering v. Stearns,
182 Wash. 234, 46 P.2d 394 (1935); Devereaux v. Blanchard, 174 Wash. 673, 26
P.2d 82 (1933).
'Laws of 1933, ch. 18. See also Richards, The Washington Automobile Guest
Statute, 12 WASH. L. REv. 138 (1937) ; Richards, Another Decade Under the Guest
Statute, 24 WASH. L. REv. 101 (1949).
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problem of reconciling these two lines of authority. In 1957, however,
the statute was amended to provide intoxication and gross negligence
as additional grounds for recovery.' In Crowley v. Barto,9 the first
definitive case arising after the 1957 amendment, the court adopted
its more recent position, rejecting the contention that gross negligence
means an "utter disregard" for the safety of the passenger."0 Without
discussing the earlier cases," the court equated "utter disregard" with
intentional neglect or wanton misconduct, concluding that this type of
conduct is in no way connected with negligence, 2 and adopted the
position that gross negligence is the failure to exercise slight care.
The court in the principal case recognized at the outset that the term
"gross negligence" has "universally escaped definition" and that "every
qualifying word added to sharpen the phrase seems to obscure in about
the same degree as it clarifies."' 3 After reviewing the prior Washington
decisions,' 4 various "academic" authorities, and a sampling of cases
from other jurisdictions, 6 the court concluded that, although its ap-
plication has produced inconsistent results, no better concept of gross
negligence has been found than its often repeated statement that gross
negligence is the failure to exercise slight care. Apparently conceding
that this statement itself conveys little meaning, the court attempted to
relate it to ordinary negligence concepts and, despite its prior warning,
to amplify the definition. Reasoning from the basic proposition that
gross negligence is an aggravated form of negligence, the court con-
' Laws of 1957, ch. 132, noted 32 WAsH. L. REv. 210 (1957). The amendment
also added the requirement that proof of the cause of action be corroborated by
evidence independent of, or in addition to, testimony of the parties. As the basic
policy behind guest statutes is often said to be prevention of collusion between
parties to fleece insurance companies, this addition indicates that the legislature
has adopted another means for effectuating the policy. This may explain the
court's recent trend toward liberalizing the basis for recovery under "gross
negligence."
"59 Wn. 2d 280, 367 P.2d 828 (1962), 38 WAsH. L. REv. 357 (1963).
1d. at 284-85, 367 P2d at 831.
"See cases cited note 5 supra.
259 Wn. 2d. at 285, 367 P.2d at 831.
'67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 320, 407 P.2d at 800.
"The court concluded from its review that, "although the definition of gross
negligence as the failure to exercise slight care has remained constant, its applica-
tion has not been uniform." Id. at 323, 407 P.2d at 802.
" The court cited 4 BLASHrFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRAC-
TicE § 2322 (1946); HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 74 (1933); 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW
oF TORTS § 16.15 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS §§ 33, 77 (2d ed. 1955) ; PROSSER, TORTS§ 34 (3d ed. 1964) ; 38 WAsr. L. REV. 357 (1963).
"The court cited Dinardi v. Herook, 328 Mass. 572, 105 N.E.2d 197 (1952)(gross negligence determined by seconds of inattention); Williamson v. McKenna,
223 Ore. 366, 354 P.2d 56 (1960) (exhaustive state-by-state review of treatment of
gross negligence in guest statutes); Cutler v. Gulf States Util. Co., 361 S.W.2d
221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) ; Atwell v. Watson, 204 Va. 624, 133 S.E.2d 552 (1963).
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cluded that it must be governed by ordinary negligence concepts, such
as the foreseeability of the risk and the amount of care exercised under
the circumstances. The court defined failure to exercise slight care as
"not the total absence of care but care substantially or appreciably
less than the quantum of care inhering in ordinary negligence.' 1 7 Cor-
relatively, gross negligence is "negligence substantially or appreciably
greater than ordinary negligence."' 8 Applying these definitions to the
facts of the principal case, the court decided that, since defendant
exercised little or no care in relation to the hazards presented by the
approaching truck, "her acts and omissions in turning suddenly into so
obvious a danger supplied evidence" from which the jury could have
found that she was grossly negligent.19
The decision in the principal case reaffirms the position taken by the
court in Crowley that gross negligence differs quantitatively rather
than qualitatively from ordinary negligence. In committing itself to
the position that gross negligence lies somewhere between a reckless
disregard of safety and negligence, on a scale of misconduct, the court
has undertaken a definitional task recognized by most authorities and
by the court itself as nearly impossible.2" Although the court acknowl-
edged the difficulties,2 it recognized that, since the legislature had used
the term, the court has a duty to provide "a workable means by which
the trial court and jury may apply gross negligence to concrete situa-
tions. 2 2
Although the court's definitional attempt seems clearly to have
failed,23 it did add to its previous concept of gross negligence two sig-
nificant refinements which seem to clarify the type of conduct the
court has in mind. The first refinement added by the court is that
slight care does not mean a complete lack of care. The defendant may
have exercised some care and still fail to meet the standard of slight
care.24 The second refinement added by the court lies in its emphasis
on the hazards presented by the situation confronting defendant.
' 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 326, 407 P.2d at 804.
18 Id. at 326, 407 P.2d at 803.
Id. at 326-27, 407 P.2d at 804.
See, e.g., 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 320, 324, 407 P.2d at 800, 802-03. PRossER,
ToRTs 150 (2d ed. 1955).
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 320, 324, 407 P.2d at 800, 802-03.
Id. at 325, 407 P.2d at 803.
"Negligence substantially and appreciably greater than ordinary negligence,"
seems no clearer than gross negligence standing alone. "Care substantially or
appreciably less than the quantum of care inhering in ordinary negligence," seems
less clear than failure to exercise slight care.
"' The dissent argues that "a degree of care which is so small that it can fit
[VOL.. 41 : 517
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The significance of the second refinement is that it seems to indicate
a willingness by the court to add the element of aggravated risk to its
previous formulation of gross negligence. The court's previous formu-
lation, which was solely in terms of failure to exercise slight care,
ignored the idea that negligence is basically a matter of risk. 5 By
formulating gross negligence in terms of both aggravated risk and an
aggravated departure from ordinary care, the court should be able to
provide a clearer idea of the type of conduct it has in mind.
It would seem that the two elements of gross negligence, as thus
formulated, would operate on a sliding scale. As the gravity of the
risk increases, the amount of care demanded by ordinary prudence
also increases, thus accounting for the court's position that the defen-
dant may be exercising more care than none and still fail to meet the
standard of slight care. Correlatively, as the gravity of the risk de-
creases, the amount of care demanded by ordinary prudence decreases,
and a more extreme departure from ordinary care should be required
before gross negligence may be found.
Although the court may never be able to escape the inherently nebu-
lous qualities of gross negligence in formulating a definition, it should
be able to move closer to its goal of providing a workable means by
which trial court and jury may apply gross negligence to concrete
situations by formulating a definition in terms of aggravated risk as
well as aggravated departure from ordinary care.
PROPRIETY OF SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO
EXPLAIN INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN
CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS
Two automobiles, approaching at right angles to each other, col-
lided midway in an intersection controlled by a traffic signal. The
guest-passenger in Car One was fatally injured. The administratrix
of his estate (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) brought a wrongful
death action against the driver of Car Two, alleging negligence. In a
separate action the driver of Car Two sought property and personal
between 'slight' and 'none' is imperceptible" under any ordinary definition of
"slight." It further argues, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 330-31, 407 P2d at 806, that:
[W]hile at first blush it would seem that the majority have conjured up a
quantity of care which is less than slight, as the term is ordinarily understood,
I think that the actual and practical effect of the opinion may be simply to
enlarge the concept of "slight". ...
PaossER, TORTS 119-20 (2d ed. 1955).
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